Skinner what is man summary

Skinner notes that credit is typically a function of the conspicuousness of control. We give less or no credit, or blame, to those who are overtly coached, compelled, prompted or otherwise not appearing to be producing actions spontaneously. Since individuals are seen to be making choices they are then able to be punished for those choices. Since Skinner argued against free will he therefore argued against punishment which he saw to be ineffective in controlling behavior.

Skinner notes that the previous solutions to punishment are often not very useful and may create additional problems. Skinner translates popular words and phrases around value issues into his view of contingencies of reinforcement. Skinner suggests that cultural evolution is a way to describe the aggregate of operant behavior. A much more important part is competition with the physical environment itself.

Skinner relates the idea of cultural evolution back to the question of values: whose values are to survive? Skinner notes that cultural design is not new, but is already existing and on-going.

Skinner notes that most discussions of current problems are dominated by metaphors, concerns for feelings and states of mind which do not illuminate possible solutions. Skinner notes that Utopian speculations, like his novel Walden Two are a kind of cultural engineering.

He then devotes much of the rest of this chapter to addressing the criticisms and complaints against cultural engineering. He also covers cognition, problem solving, self-control and counters some arguments or possible misconceptions.

Skinner addresses the issue of mechanical models of human action, which are better addressed elsewhere. We have not yet seen what man can make of man.

Burrhus Frederic Skinner was a highly influential American psychologist, author, inventor, advocate for social reform and poet. When disagreement occurs and some say "p" while others "not-p," both parties have to have said what they said.

To then inquire into whether "p" or "not-p" is true can only result in the further problem of everyone having to say what he will about that. And so forth, ad infinitum. Therefore by the tenets and requirements of determinism, it is impossible ever to render a decision as to whether determinism is a true doctrine - a correct theory of human behavior.

The requirement is that nothing we do can be free of outside or inherited control. Thus the articulation of determinism must also be an unfree act. When a deterministic analysis emerges from the lips of the determinist, by that view nothing else could have emerged. By the same token nothing else could have come from the lips of anyone who denies the truth of determinism. From the point of view of the determinist neither position could be held by choice.

In the end the main problem with Skinnerian and other kinds of all-encompassing determinism is that the position actually must assume what it flatly denies. Some philosophers have put it thus: "Every determinist makes the claim that his account of the data is superior to his opponent's, and therefore ought to be accepted in preference to the alternative position.

Only those who admit that people can make choices can ask of them that they ought to do something; determinists can only predict that they will or will not. The idea that one ought to do something assumes that he could do it or refrain from doing it. And by advocating determinism the Skinnerians et al. Determinism, then, has a major flaw: it is inconsistent.

While Skinner believes that his form of behaviorism does not have to yield to logic, for those who like their philosophies and science to conform to the principles of logic—which are after all grounded on the nature of reality itself—this is not at all satisfactory. What must be remembered, however, is that the above objections are not sufficient to prove that human beings are free.

This is crucial. Thus far we have only argued against Skinner and have not proposed an alternative view: What we have so far shown is that Skinner's theory cannot be proved. Perhaps people never are free—some, I am sure, never exercise their capacity for choice, others do so very infrequently.

What we aim to prove is that people can be free, that determinism is false. Actually Skinner spends very little time on the idea of human freedom; he flatly denies that he discusses the problem. Since he believes that science must exclude human freedom, he does not seem to think that any independent argument for determinism is needed. I have dealt with the issue at some length because Skinner largely rests his position about man, society, and the future on his constantly reiterated denial of free will.

Why does he do this? Why does he feel he must reject even the possibility of human freedom? He does so in preparation for his denial of human dignity, of the fact that people can be better or worse, that they can achieve or fail, not just at some tasks but at living a successful life—at being morally excellent.

All these notions, including the appropriateness of punishment in cases where persons do certain irresponsible things depend on the fact that people are usually free to choose between alternative courses of conduct.

And to pave the way toward the rejection of these facts and corresponding ideas about human affairs, Skinner has to attack the very possibility of human freedom of choice. In everyday affairs as well as in critical situations human dignity plays an important role. The fact that everyone possesses the dignity of human life enables them to act in ways that they otherwise would not. For instance, although most of us know only a few persons intimately enough to have a personal regard for them, we are certainly acquainted with many other people.

Our capacity for moral worth, that is, our human dignity answers the question of how these people, without any close relationship to us, ought to be treated. Perhaps not everyone needs to know that human beings possess dignity, that they are capable of moral achievement and should be understood in that light.

But in many circumstances our emotions, immediate concerns, fears, or related factors can obliterate the empathy or natural feelings community people can have for each other.

This is especially so in cities with large populations where we know only a few people among those encountered each day. The feelings of kinship, friendship, and fraternity can be superseded by other, more hostile emotions. Yet even then other people are due at least a minimal degree of respect, simply by virtue of their humanity, however remotely that touches one at the moment. The idea that people are capable of freedom and can have moral aspirations of their own can be a lifesaver.

Those who think before acting under emotional strains and other pressures certainly have a firmer than ad hoc guideline on how to deal with others. Not that we must view human dignity as some kind of useful myth.

Without a basis, our belief in it could lead only to error—quite as Skinner would contend. Yet keeping in mind man's essential dignity, the fact that each person is capable of moral growth, is both in accordance with good judgment and fruitful conduct. Human dignity is the link between the fact that people are capable of free choice and the value of political liberty for their social existence.

Skinner knows this. If man has dignity, then violating his rights so as to secure some "nobler" aim—e. Should it be proven, however, that dignity is a myth, that no man is worth the trouble in the face of such a "glorious" goal as the survival of a culture whatever that means—for that notion belongs with such other vague ones as "society," "civilization," "race," "the people," and so on , then resistance to any social engineering cannot but be intellectually unfounded and based on irrational fears, just as Skinner suggests.

The advocates and defenders of liberty are then simply unstable and emotionally disturbed. If one accepts that human dignity is a myth, this suggestion doubtless has a great deal of force.

Skinner would seem to have every reason to combat the ideas of freedom and dignity, to marshal science, technology, and the art of rhetoric in his behalf. They are his major obstacles on the road to a world of behavior technologists who would induce everyone to promote the survival of the culture. What then is Skinner's substantive objection to the idea of human dignity? Basically he argues ad hominem. He tries to show that whenever people refer to human dignity, they are really after some dubious goal—they are deceitful, sneaky, and altogether underhanded.

Consider what he says: "We attempt to gain credit by disguising or concealing control. We try to gain credit by inventing less compelling reasons for our conduct. Dignity for Skinner is what merits credit, so we claim dignity to gain credit. Beyond assaulting the motives of those who stand up for it and those who refer to it in their own or someone else's case, Skinner has nothing to say in criticism of human dignity.

He does note that the idea of dignity is often used to justify punishment—after all, he rather simplistically maintains, if credit is due for achievement, punishment must be due for failure. He cites no one who defends such a crass view of punishment—but then he cites no one extensively enough to give himself some kind of challenge. What is so puzzling is that Skinner's indictment of those who hide behind phony claims to credit, based on mythical notions about dignity or worth, cannot make sense within his frame of reference.

But he does not bother to explain these inconsistencies. To disguise, conceal, invent, refrain, refuse, avoid, or court temptation all presuppose the ability to choose freely. Other than his original disclaimer about consistency, attributed to the prescientific character of the English language, Skinner says nothing to justify his exposition. A point to be noticed here, easily obliterated in the search for arguments not forthcoming, is Skinner's approach to his readers.

He counts on people's acceptance of humility as a cardinal virtue. He trades on this by discrediting any admission of self-worth, of the very possibility that one may indeed have earned some credit, or that any of the values one has come by are really through one's own achievements. Most people consider excessive pride a fault. It is generally called conceit or vanity. And overemphasizing one's achievements, especially in public, is an example.

Society can change human behavior through the application of social sciences, such as psychology, especially through behaviorism, a set of theories that say human behavior is best explained by behavior, not through thoughts and feelings.

Related summaries: books by B. Skinner Walden Two. He established the terms conditioning , stimulus , and response for the science of behaviour. C K Christian Kuhn Author. Add to cart. Table of Contents Structure 1. Introduction 2.

Conclusion Literature 1. Introduction It seems impossible to give a precise definition of the term philosophy and the teachings that are connected with it. Sign in to write a comment. Read the ebook. Increasing Brain Power beyond Imagina The Sublime and the Beautiful in the Subsidies in the European Agriculture Victor Hugo's "Notre Dame de Das Erhabene - Le Sublime.

A Right to Life before Birth. Human D The Sublime in the English Gothic Nov Bridging the digital divide: Was unte The haunted wilderness as the Sublime Edmund Burke's Theory of the Subl